In contrast to earlier recessions, the monetary regimes of many small economies have not changed in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. This is due in part to the fact that many small economies continue to use hard exchange rate fixes, a reasonably durable regime. However, most of the new stability is due to countries that float with an inflation target. Though a few have left to join the Eurozone, no country has yet abandoned an inflation targeting regime under duress. Inflation targeting now represents a serious alternative to a hard exchange rate fix for small economies seeking monetary stability. Are there important differences between the economic outcomes of the two stable regimes? I examine a panel of annual data from more than 170 countries from 2007 through 2012 and find that the macroeconomic and financial consequences of regime-choice are surprisingly small. Consistent with the literature, business cycles, capital flows, and other phenomena for hard fixers have been similar to those for inflation targeters during the Global Financial Crisis and its aftermath.
Introduction
The global financial crisis (hereafter "GFC") of 2007-9 began and was felt most keenly in the rich Northern countries. Nevertheless, much of its effect was felt abroad; the great recession of 2008-09 was a global affair. Small economies were indirectly affected as the shock waves spilled out from New York and London, most dramatically in the form of contractions in the international flow of capital and trade. My interest in this paper is comparing how the outcomes for small economies varied by their choice of monetary regime. I am particularly interested in contrasting two monetary regimes: hard exchange rate fixes, and floating with an inflation target. Both are well-defined monetary regimes that are widely used by small economies around the world. The two regimes are also quite different, potentially providing a sharp comparison. Did one monetary regime provide more insulation from the GFC than the other?
The Great Recession associated with the GFC was the most dramatic macroeconomic event in generations; as Imbs (2010) Interest in academic studies of currency crises (typically when a fixed exchange rate is abandoned) has greatly diminished over the last fifteen years. A number of small economies whose experiences spawned important academic research are now sufficiently stable as to be boring, including (at the very least) Brazil, Chile, Korea, Mexico, Sweden, Thailand, and Turkey. The common element in the transition from newsworthy to stability is the adoption of a monetary regime of a floating exchange rate with an inflation target. While before 2007 there were legitimate questions about the durability of inflation targeting, it has now withstood a substantial trial by fire. 2 Between the hard fixes and inflation targeters, most of the international monetary system has withstood the pressures of the GFC and its aftermath in at least one critical aspect: it has preserved itself.
My analysis in this paper is broad in the sense that I analyze a number of macroeconomic phenomena for more than 170 small economies. My focus is also narrow: I am most interested in the period since 2006, and I am interested in the effects of the monetary regime, primarily on the way international capital flows were handled. 3 My quantification of the monetary regime relies on a comprehensive classification of de facto behavior, gathered by the IMF.
I have two major results. First, monetary regimes have remained stable and unchanged during the GFC and its aftermath for a large number of countries, those of hard fixers and inflation targeters.
The recent finding of monetary stability contrasts with earlier periods; historically, countries have switched their regimes counter-cyclically, that is especially during recessions. Since there are now two reasonably stable monetary regimes available to small economies which appear to be starkly different, it is natural to ask which has performed better, especially during the turbulent period since 2006. In practice this question is hard to answer: while both hard fix and inflation targeting countries have experienced (for instance) lower inflation than other countries, the business cycles, capital flows, current accounts, government budgets, real exchange rates, asset prices and so forth do not seem to vary significantly between the two regimes. Thus my second major result is that the recent macroeconomic and financial performance of small countries with hard fixed exchange rates is similar to that for countries which float with an inflation target. At first blush, this seems surprising, since a hard commitment to an exchange rate fix seems quite different from the constrained discretion of an inflation target. However, the result is actually quite consistent with the literature which has been generally unable to find strong consequences of the regime, except for exchange rate volatility.
A Broad Data Set on the Monetary Regime
One of my goals in this work is to be as comprehensive as possible. I begin with the entire sample of countries available in the World Bank's World Development Indicators. In all, I have at least some data for 214 countries (though there are many gaps). 4 However, the focus of this study is on small economies; accordingly, for much of the analysis which follows I simply remove large economies.
Adopting the taxonomy of the IMF's Spillover Reports, I exclude from the sample the five systematically important economies of China, the Euro-zone, Japan, the UK, and the USA.
One key variable of interest missing from the WDI is the national monetary regime. In the past, researchers have resorted to using the formal de jure exchange rate regime as declared by the national monetary authorities. What I need is a classification of the monetary regime available throughout the aftermath of the GFC. To its credit, the IMF long ago switched to a de facto classification of monetary regimes in AREAER.
The fund provides an official series available back through 2001 for each of its members; I take full advantage and use this de facto monetary regime classification through 2012. 5 The IMF divides countryyears into an exhaustive taxonomy with 44 cells which vary by exchange rate rigidity, the orientation of the fix (most countries peg to either the dollar or the euro), and the objective of floating rate regimes (countries target either inflation or a monetary aggregate, though some also use 'other' frameworks). I use this monetary classification extensively below; for sensitivity and historical analysis, I also employ the LYS, RR, and SB schemes.
Monetary Regimes During and in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis
Monetary regimes have remained remarkably stable from the run-up to the GFC through its aftermath.
First a few words about the recent monetary regimes of the big fish. There are five large economies: China, Japan, the EMU, the UK, and the USA. 6 The recent history of their monetary regimes is tabulated in Table 1 . Four maintained the same monetary regime throughout the period, as judged by the IMF: the EMU, Japan and the USA floated throughout the period with an "other" framework, while the UK floated with an inflation target. 7 These economies are … large; they accounted for over half of global GDP in 2001 and still accounted for 43% in 2012. China is the exception -albeit a large and important one -having switched its monetary regime three times in the period.
The focus of this paper is on the remaining economies, which I define as small, and on the onset and aftermath of the GFC. A contention of this paper is that the monetary regimes of small economies have -like those of large economies -exhibited stability since before the GFC. This stability is new, and contrasts with the historical (counter-) cyclicality of monetary regime switches. 8 The stability is also remarkable compared with the size of recent macroeconomic and financial shocks. This is not true only using the IMF's classification. Mishkin (2004) lists five components of inflation targeting (a medium-term numerical target for inflation; an institutional commitment to price stability as primary goal of monetary policy; an information-inclusive strategy to set instruments; central bank transparency; and central bank accountability). Mishkin's criteria would lead to the same conclusion.
By way of contrast, 83 small economies maintained a hard fix in 2006. I define a hard fix as a monetary regime with either: a) no separate legal tender, b) a currency board arrangement, or c) a conventional peg. 10 60 of these fixes were maintained continuously through the end of the sample in 2012, and were thus also proven to be durable; these will be of special interest to me below. 11 The 2012 monetary regimes for the other 23 countries are listed in Table 2 Another interesting feature of Table 3 is the (counter-) cyclic nature of the regime changes for the sloppy center. This is apparent visually in Figure 1 , which plots the number of countries in hard fixes, inflation-targeting floats and other regimes, year by year. For reference, Figure 1 Figure 2 , which is the analogue to Figure 1 but portrays the fraction of global GDP in each of my three monetary regimes (rather than their un-weighted number). It is striking how large and stable the fraction of global GDP resides in inflation targeting regimes, even through the GFC and its aftermath. More rigorous evidence on the counter-cyclicality of regime shifts is provided in Table 6 . I am interested in whether a country is more likely to switch its monetary regimes during bad times. Rather regimes are counter-cyclic in a statistically significant sense. Turnover in both LYS and RR exchange rate regimes is also counter-cyclic, though rarely different from zero at standard significance levels. All eighteen point estimates in Table 6 imply that monetary regimes switch more during bad times.
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I conclude from this analysis that monetary regime transitions have historically been countercyclic. The stability of national monetary regimes is not only a recent phenomenon, it is unexpected given the size of the Great Recession.
Differences between Monetary Regimes: Determinants
I am primarily interested in the consequences of monetary regimes, but it is probably necessary to spend a little time beforehand on how countries choose their monetary regimes. Remarkably little is known on this topic; recent survey material is available in Klein and Shambaugh (2010) and Rose (2011) .
The first impression is that it is difficult to compare the durable hard fixers with the inflation targeters, since they seem to be different beasts. Table 7 tabulates some simple descriptive statistics for key features of the monetary regime, split into hard fixes, inflation targeters and the remaining sloppy center. I take advantage of the Stone-Bhundia data set, which ends in 2005 and so pre-dates the GFC.
Hard fixers are, on average, both smaller and poorer than inflation targeters; in both cases the difference is statistically significant as shown by the t-test presented in the right-hand column. Figure 3 provides the visual analogue to Table 7 ; it compares the distribution of four key characteristics for hard fixers and inflation-targeters in 2011 (the last year for which WDI data are available). Consider the top-left chart, which graphs the quantiles of log real GDP per capita for fixers in 2011 (on the y-axis) against comparable data for inflation targeters (on the x-axis). 21 A diagonal line is provided for reference; if income were similarly distributed across the two regimes, the data would be plotted along the diagonal. In fact, the data are below the diagonal; fixers tend to be poorer than inflation targeters, consistent with the message of Table 7 . But the differences can be over-stated; real income is similar for many hard fixers and inflation targeters, and indeed the richest fixers enjoy more income than the inflation targeters. Similarly, the differences in openness to trade (portrayed in the bottom-right) do not seem great. Dramatic differences are immediately and pervasively apparent for population and polity.
While the univariate cross-regime differences present in Table 7 seem encouraging, there is no guarantee that they will stand up under greater econometric scrutiny, especially given the graphical evidence of Figure 3 . I present some multivariate statistical results in Table 8 . Each column contains estimates from a different multinomial logit regression. 22 The top panel presents coefficient estimates of the effects of various determinants on the choice of a hard fix, while the middle panel is the analogue for inflation targeting. The omitted regime is the sloppy center so that, for instance, the negative effect of log population in the top row implies that small countries are more likely to choose a hard fix than to choose the sloppy center; similarly, the positive effect of log population in the middle panel implies that larger countries are more likely to choose an inflation target. A variety of diagnostics are collected in the bottom panel.
Few of the results in Table 8 are surprising. Small countries are more likely to fix, while large and rich countries are somewhat more likely to float with an inflation target. The most striking difference between the two regimes is political; democracies are significantly more likely to target inflation, while autocracies are more likely to fix. But the effects of openness, both real and financial, are negligible. 23 The equations fit poorly; it is hard to model the determination of monetary regimes. 
Effects of Monetary Regimes
Statistical Evidence I now examine the recent consequences of monetary regimes for small economies. One might reasonably expect floating with an inflation target to be a diametrically opposed monetary regime compared with a durable hard fix, especially for handling the shockwaves that spilled out from the large economies as a consequence of the GFC. How did actual performance under the two regimes differ?
Since my chief interest is in comparing the characteristics of recent stable monetary regimes, I
split my sample into three groups which I will use for the analysis that follows: a) inflation targeters (such as Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and Canada); b) the sixty small economies that maintained hard fixes continuously in 2006-12 (Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong, and Denmark), and c) the observations from the remaining sloppy center (India, Russia, and Iran). 25 The first two of these monetary regimes are longlived and durable, often pre-dating the crisis significantly. As shown above, it is also difficult to find systematic determinants of the monetary regime. Above and beyond the persistent effects of size and democracy, monetary regimes seem to be almost random. Accordingly, in the analysis below I initially treat the choice of monetary regime as plausibly exogenous, so as to be able to estimate the effects of the monetary regime on outcomes of interest without further econometric hassles. I ask: should we care about which monetary regime a small country chooses? Has the monetary regime made a substantial difference to the macro-economies of small economies in the period since the onset of the GFC? Tables 9 and 10 Test results for two hypotheses of interest are tabulated at the right; a) the hypothesis that the hard fix and inflation targeting regimes have the same effect (compared with the sloppy center), and b) that the two regimes have no effect. The equations are estimated via least squares with fixed time-and random country-specific effects. 26 While there is little reason to believe that hard fix and IT regimes are chosen endogenously for reasons of relevance to the variables of interest, I address this issue more directly below with two more sophisticated econometric techniques.
I examine a number of variables so as to be able to examine a range of consequences of capital flows from large economies. I look at output consequences, the capital flows themselves, and the mechanisms through which a small economy can adjust to capital flows.
At the top of Table 9 , I look at business cycle effects, as measured by real GDP de-trended in the five ways discussed earlier; this is one of the most important consequents of policy choice. Since this paper is concerned with the effects of monetary regimes on small economies through the tumultuous period of the GFC, it is almost as important to examine capital flows. 27 I take advantage of the series as carefully constructed by Forbes and Warnock (2011) , and examine gross capital inflows and outflows, as well as net capital flows. 28 Since the volatility of capital flows is of interest, I also construct the countryspecific standard deviation of both inflows and outflows (over time) so as to be able to examine the effect of monetary regimes on the cross-country variation of capital flows. Table 10 is an analogue to Table 9 , but examines prices. I include two conventional measures of goods and services domestic inflation (CPI and GDP), as well as the real effective exchange rate and its change. The effect of the monetary regime on asset prices is the subject of much recent debate. Accordingly, I examine three important assets: the yield on the long bond, and the growth in both stock and property prices. 32 Jointly, these variables cover a wide range of potential responses to international capital inflows.
What do the data show about the consequences of monetary regime choice? Very little.
Perhaps most importantly, Table 9 shows that the magnitude of the business cycle does not seem to have varied significantly between inflation targeters and hard fixers over the period since 2007; there is weak evidence that countries in both regimes suffered somewhat worse than the sloppy center (I do not dwell on this results since it does not stand up to further econometric scrutiny, as I show below). This weak result is consistent with the fact that capital flows and their volatility seem not to vary across monetary regimes; the exception is that inflation targeting regimes received larger net capital flows.
Neither the current account nor the growth of either exports or imports varies consistently with the monetary regime. Inflation targeting regimes increased the ability of their residents to invest freely, but the other two measures of capital mobility show no significant differences across regimes. Perhaps most strikingly, there are also no significant differences across regimes in the growth of international reserves, the money supply, or broad measures of fiscal policy.
It turns out that the weak results in Table 9 does not stem from the methodology or the fact that the data set is limited to six annual observations (admittedly for up to 167 countries). As Table 9 shows, both CPI and GDP inflation are about 5% lower for both hard fixes and inflation targeters, compared with the sloppy center, an economically and statistically significant result. 33 Since one of the chief tasks of a monetary regime is to deliver low inflation, this is an important and comforting result.
Interestingly, both the level and the rate of change in real exchange rates over this period are lower (more depreciated) for both hard fixers and inflation targeters compared with the sloppy center, though these results are only on the verge of statistical significance. Stock prices have fallen more for hard fixers than the sloppy center. The growth of property prices and bond yields is insignificantly different across monetary regimes. Tables 9-10 for hard fixers and inflation-targeters. Thus the top-left chart of Figure 4 graphs the quantiles of real GDP growth for fixers since 2007 (on the y-axis) to growth over the same period for inflation targeters (on the x-axis). With the exception of a few outliers at both ends of the distribution, most of the data are scattered close to the diagonal line, consistent with the notion that growth for most hard fixers is similar to that for inflation targeters (though hard fixers experience more outliers, both positive and negative). The pattern for CPI inflation and the government budget are similar, while the distribution of the current accounts is more extreme for hard fixers. In general though, the distributions for key variables seem similar across monetary regimes for capital in-and outflows, international reserve growth, the change in the real effective exchange rate, and asset price changes. One exception is net capital flows, which are systematically higher for inflation targeters.
Sensitivity Analysis
Since monetary regimes are not randomly distributed across economies, the results in Tables 9-10 may be subject to simultaneity bias. I try to handle that in Tables 11-12 , analogues estimated with instrumental variables. As instrumental variables, I use the log of population and polity, the two variables which showed consistent non-trivial differences across monetary regimes above.
Comfortingly, the IV results are broadly similar to those estimated with least squares. Inflation is lower for both inflation targeters and hard fixers than for the sloppy center, and by about the same amount;
there is also weaker evidence of a negative exchange rate effect. Hard fixers experienced bigger stockmarket declines, while inflation targeters received more capital inflows and increased their investment Happily, the matching results mostly confirm those from more conventional estimation techniques. Net capital flows are higher for inflation targeters, as is the change in investment freedom.
The evidence on output effects is weak, statistically significant only for the most unreliable de-trending technique. Both hard fixers and inflation targeters experience lower inflation and more depreciated real exchange rates. A few of the asset price results are different (there is no longer a significant effect on stock markets, but bond yields seem lower for both inflation targeters and hard fixers).
Summary
On the whole, all three statistical techniques deliver similar results. One of these results is of particular interest: there is rarely any significant difference on the variables I examine between the effects of inflation targeting and hard fixes. There are three exceptions: net capital flows, the change in investment freedom, and stock prices (though none of the differences is statistically significant for matching estimation). This is a striking result that essentially runs throughout the statistical analysis. It seems, initially, to be implausible; after all, these monetary regimes differ radically. The notion that the monetary regime matters surprisingly little is not new; see e.g., the recent book by Klein and Shambaugh (2010) and references therein. 37 The abstract of Baxter and Stockman (1989) includes "Aside from greater variability of real exchange rates under flexible than under pegged nominal exchange-rate systems, we find little evidence of systematic differences in the behavior of macroeconomic aggregates or international trade flows under alternative exchange-rate systems." 38 While an absence of any large detectable differences across monetary regimes might seem bizarre to a monetary economist, it is almost folk wisdom inside international finance.
To summarize: small economies that float with an inflation target have, in many respects, behaved similarly to hard fixers over the post-bubble period. This might be an artifact of the econometric methodology I have employed (though I have used a few), or of the size of the data set (though there are over 160 countries in the sample). But that seems unlikely. The literature has been unable to find many significant differences across monetary regimes; perhaps there simply are few. It seems that the tradeoffs between hard fixers and inflation targeters lie more in the operation of monetary policy than in their manifestations in real economic outcomes. It is natural to think that a big shock -like the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recessionwill put the system to the test and reveal which is the best monetary regime. We've now had the big shock and it appears that now -as opposed to the Great Depression or the early 1970s -the current system can indeed survive a serious crisis. That said, the shock has not provided any clear guidance as to which monetary regime is preferable for small economies; the experiences of countries in hard fixes during and after the GFC have been similar to those of inflation targeters. 
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.04 (.8) Coefficients displayed for average treatment effect of "treatment" monetary regime compared to "control" monetary regime on regressand. Standard errors in parentheses; coefficients significantly different from zero at .05 (.01) marked with one (two) asterisk(s). Nearest neighbor matching (five matches) on government size (% GDP) and unemployment rate. Annual data spanning 2007-2012, 167 countries (with gaps). 18 Note that the estimates in Table 6 are contemporaneous; they could surely be strengthened by taking lags into account appropriately. Also, all economies are included in Table 6 ; excluding large economies does not change any results substantively. 19 For the first, I use the polity2 variable, which ranges from -10 (autocracy) to +10 (democracy), taken from the Polity IV project; http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. I have also experimented less successfully with measures such as those Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi produce in the World Governance project.
20 Information on the Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness is available at http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/ChinnIto_website.htm while data and discussion on the Index of Economic Freedom is available at http://www.heritage.org/index/. Financial freedom is defined as "a measure of banking efficiency as well as a measure of independence from government control and interference in the financial sector " while "In an economically free country, there would be no constraints on the flow of investment capital. Individuals and firms would be allowed to move their resources into and out of specific activities, both internally and across the country's borders, without restriction. Such an ideal country would receive a score of 100 on the investment freedom component of the Index of Economic Freedom."
21 Quantiles are points taken at regular intervals from the cumulative distribution function of a random variable. Dividing ordered data into q essentially equal-sized data subsets is the motivation for q-quantiles; the quantiles are the data values marking the boundaries between consecutive subsets (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantile). 22 These regressions are run without either time-or country-specific fixed effects. There is little reason to expect important effects from the former, though there is much reason to believe that the latter would be highly statistically significant. Still, the objective of Table 8 is to understand why countries choose their monetary regimes; including only variation around countryspecific intercepts would essentially wipe out all effects of interest. The standard errors are robust, and have been clustered by country.
23 This non-result stands in contrast to much of the literature. For instance, Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006) argue that many emerging markets maintain some sort of peg because it is infeasible for them to float, as they lack the preconditions for capital account openness necessary for exchange rate flexibility. Capital account liberalization requires strong financial systems, prudential supervision and regulation, transparency and reliable corporate governance, and financial markets to provide instruments for firms and banks to hedge exchange rate risk. But the results of Table 8 imply that capital mobility is not in fact an independently important determinant of the monetary regime; this idea is worth pursuing further. 24 This negative result is actually good news, since it allows one to model the effects of monetary regimes more plausibly. 25 Since some countries in the last group are in hard fixes for some of the period (and thus not in a sloppy center monetary regime each year), I use this taxonomy at some, hopefully small, risk of confusion. 26 Since the countries in the hard fixes and inflation targeting regimes are chosen because of their durability, country fixedeffects would render regime effects inestimable. 27 An alternative strategy would be to follow the methodology of Klein and Shambaugh (2013) and directly examine the strength of interest rate linkages across monetary regimes.
28 I thank Kristin Forbes and Frank Warnock for providing me with their data set. 29 For the cross-sectional analysis, I do not include either country or time effects.
30 Montiel (1998) provides a convenient taxonomy.
31 I ignore intervention that is effective, permanent, and sterilized; Engel (2013) writes in his recent survey "Very few studies have found significant evidence of a sustained effect of sterilized intervention on the level of the exchange rate."
